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A METAPHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTION ON THE 
ARISTOTELIAN AND KANTIAN TREAT-
MENTS OF TIME 
A CONSTANT DANGER which besets anyone who endeavors to compare the doctrine of two philosophers 
on a single topic is that he might station himself at 
the attitude-perspective on one of the philosophers and criticize 
the other purely in terms of this vantage point. I£ criticizing 
one system or philosopher from the vantage point of another 
system or philosopher is not the prime reason for the seemingly 
irreconcilable rifts between philosophical schools, it at least 
contributes to these rifts. And very often, like the yankee in 
a foreign country, the philosophers must end up pointing at 
things or inventing terms on the spur of the moment, in order 
to make themselves understood, if possible, in lieu of the 
" language " of the strangers. 
In this article I will, of course, try to avoid "negativity" in 
the sense of argumentativeness. Does this imply that I will 
attempt to view the doctrines of Kant and Aristotle from 
above, as it were? Perhaps, more precisely, from between the 
both of them. From this " position" I would like to set myself 
the task, not of locating logical identities, nor of finding mathe-
matically exact congruences, but merely of observing general 
symmetries in the doctrines of the two men on a specific topic. 
The fact that one presupposes that such symmetry can be 
found might, of course, suggest an a priori bias towards over-
simplification. But if he analyzes the writings of both philo-
sophers and happens to notice a notable similarity of content 
represented under notably different forms, this would seem to 
be a case of "a posteriori observation" in the domain of 
philosophy. That is, the "observation" of attitudes and an 
attempt to draw unified conclusions from these observations. 
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But i£ this be a valid approach, it would certainly be naive 
and undisciplined unless there were first a realization o£ the 
definite, solid differences in the viewpoints o£ the two authors 
in question. Therefore, before we examine the symmetries, 
mention should be made o£ the differences (£or without the 
differences, symmetry would not be there, only identity): 
Three major differences might be noted in the philosophies 
o£ Aristotle and Kant: 
1) Aristotle set out to describe the physical world, going on 
the fundamental presupposition that the world was, indeed, 
intelligible. What was then necessary, upon this presupposi-
tion, was to make its potential intelligibility something actual, 
to bring its latent forms out into the open-in words, in 
concepts; and then, by a logical analysis o£ the properties o£ 
actual, intelligible form, to develop a metaphysics/ which, once 
made explicit, would in turn lend definiteness and clarity to 
the physical world in a semi-autonomous way. But Kant's 
interests lay not so much in describing and delimiting the 
physical world, as in setting proper bounds to man's faculty o£ 
reason. Under impetus o£ the faith that he could best serve 
science and philosophy by accurately determining, once and £or 
all, just what man could know and not know, and the various 
ways in which he could be related to the knowable, and the 
various ways in which he could be deceived as to the pseudo-
knowable, he set himself to accomplish a more "introverted " 
task. His starting point was reflection, and his goal the explora-
tion o£ the faculty o£ reflection: reason. And therefore it is 
significant that, while Aristotle developed a system o£ cate-
gories o£ physical being, Kant developed a system o£ categories 
by means o£ which we must think. 
2) In consonance with his concentration upon the domain 
o£ pure reason, Kant was primarily interested in solving the 
major problems raised by that ambiguous zone where sub-
jective and objective meet; that is, the zone where intuitions 
1 Cf. Physics, II, 2, 194b; I, 9, 192a. 
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are unified in concepts, or where ideas, rightly or wrongly, 
are given determinate phenomenal reference as content. In 
terms of his solutions to these problems, he also arrived at the 
corollary conclusion that we can know nothing about the 
positive reality of a substance behind phenomena, or a " thing-
in-itself," although we must presuppose some such reality be-
cause of the exigencies of our logical processes. Kant seems to 
think that Aristotle also held, at least implicitly, an analogous 
notion about matter, that is, that matter was a substratum 
which had to be presupposed for appearances and that the 
necessity which was ascribed to matter was a merely logical 
necessity.2 And such a notion may, indeed, be implicit in, e. g., 
the dictum of Aristotle that the " intelligible in act " is equi-
valent to the "intelligence in act." But explicitly, Aristotle 
always seems to treat of intelligible matter as something 
positive 3 and existing-in-itsel£.4 
3) Kant, seeming to go on the presupposition that a philo-
sophical system can only be complete and lucid when it is 
deduced in a manifestly unified way, looks upon Aristotle's 
system of categories as "defective." For Aristotle seems to 
have "merely picked them up as they came his way," 5 not 
proceeding on the basis of any predetermined unifying method, 
but purporting to find by experience a complete set of objec-
tively different types of things in the physical world. But 
Kant proposes for himself the task of overcoming the defici-
encies of such a " haphazard " method by exploring the basis 
for all distinction and "objective" differentiation, namely, the 
mind's operations of judgment. And thus his system will give 
2 Critique of Pum Reason (N. Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 516; (A 616; 
B 644) . All references to Kant's first critique in the body of this study will be to 
the 1781 and 1787 editions (A and B editions) . References to the A and B 
pagination are given in the Meiner German edition and in St. Martin's Press 
English Edition, both of which were used in the preparation of this article. Thus 
the A and B citations can be indirectly used to find texts in these two editions. 
"Physics, I, 9, 19~a; Aristotle sharply differentiates his position here from that of 
Plato, who looked upon matter as privation per se. 
• Ibid., I, 6, 190a; also I, 9, 192a. 
5 Critique of Pure Reason, p. 114; Meiner ed., S. 119 (A 81; B 107). 
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rise to a priori certainty and absolute comprehensivity, while 
Aristotle's would have only a tentative a posteriori certainty, 
i. e., a probability subject constantly to revision. 
Thus Kant takes as his starting point the inexorable laws 
of logic, proceeds to describe the world of pure reason in terms 
of the categories of thought, and also gives special attention to 
the problematics of the subjective-objective no-man's-land of 
" appearance." Aristotle, on the other hand, seems to take 
physical facts as his starting point, and thereupon to describe 
the changing and unchanging aspects of the physical world, 
even striving to deduce a set of empirically comprehensive 
categories of objective types of physical being. 
The recognition of these polar differences puts us in a po-
sition now to examine the " symmetries " in the doctrines of 
the two philosophers in regard to the subject of time. 
SYNTHETICAL CoMPARISON oF THE DocTRINES oF 
KANT AND ARISTOTLE 
For purposes of clarity I will in the following section present 
various pivotal notions of Kant in regard to time in the 
form of theses, and then elaborate on the corresponding " sym-
metrical " positions which seem to be implicit or explicit in 
Aristotle. Kant's theses, however, it should be noted, will be 
used only as a springboard for division of the subject under 
consideration and not as a criterion in terms of which judg-
ment is passed on Aristotle. 
1) The Subjective Aspect of Time: 
THESIS: TIME IS A SUBJECTIVE FORM A PRIORI WHICH 
CANNOT BE THOUGHT OF AS ABSENT AND WHICH SUPPLIES 
THE APODEICTIC CONDITIONS FOR ALL RELATIONS OF CON-
TRADICTORILY OPPOSED PREDICATES IN SCIENCES OF MO-
TION AND ALTERATION WITHOUT GOING SO FAR AS TO GIVE 
THEM THE DETERMINATE UNITY OF A CONCEPT. (Critique of 
Pure Reason, A 31, B 46) 
Aristotle does not say explicitly that time is a fundament-
ally subjective notion. He does, however, raise the question as 
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to whether there could be such a thing as time in the absence of 
a human subject, i. e., a knowing soul.6 And he comes to the 
conclusion that time in such a case would exist as measurable 7 
(i. e., as potential) within motion, provided that motion itself 
could be said to exist under such conditions. Such a hypo-
thetical conclusion, although it does imply that time under 
such conditions would probably be nothing actuai,B neverthe-
less does not opt for any preeminence of the " subjective " 
nature of time, especially in the Aristotelian framework, where 
the potential and the empirical are not prejudged for epistemo--
logical reasons to be less important than the actual and the a 
priori. But we can say that Aristotle recognizes the fact that 
time is quite subjective in nature, without going so far (as did 
Kant) to emphasize the subjective over the objective aspect. 
Likewise, Aristotle gives us an indication that time in its 
subjective aspect is not a determinate concept (universal 
" form ") , since the formation of all intellectual concepts must, 
according to him, take place outside of time.9 And without 
saying that it is a "form of sensibility" he does indicate that 
it is applicable only to a special sphere of existence, i. e., the 
realm of passing phenomena, of physical transmutation. 
2) Its Foundation in Internal Perception: 
THESIS: TIME IS A MOST GENERAL INNER DETERMINA-
TION WHICH WE GIVE TO ALL REPRESENTATIONS AND IS 
INDEED THE RESULT OF THE SUCCESSION OF THESE REPRE-
SENTATIONS BEING INTIMATELY APPROPRIATED THROUGH 
THE EMPIRICAL SELF OF CONSCIOUSNESS. (Critique of Pure 
Reason; 10 A 33, B 49) 
The fact that our awareness of time is somehow linked up 
with our perception of the empirical processes or motions of 
• Physics IV, 14, 223a. 
7 Cf. Randall, Aristotle (N. Y.: Columbia University, 1960), p. 202. 
8 Cf. Copleston, A History of Philosophy (N. Y.: Doubleday Image, 1962), Vol. 
6, Part II, p .65. 
• Cf. Mure, Aristotle, p. 214. 
1° Cf. also Collins, History of Modern European Philosophy (Milwaukee: Bruce, 
1961)' p. 481. 
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our consciousness is recognized in a negative way by Aristotle 
when he states that when we are unconscious in sleep, etc., time 
"ceases" with respect to us.11 He puts the matter in a more 
positive way when he says that, in a completely dark room, we 
garner the perception of the passage of time precisely by 
noticing the movements of our own mind.12 The necessary and 
sufficient condition for our subjective ascription of time to 
events would seem, then, to lie in some minimal awareness of 
the alterations in our phenomenal self, through proprioception. 
But again, whereas in Kant such an inner determination is 
described as a (subjective) form of sensibility, in Aristotle it 
is referred to as a "common sensible" (i.e., an objective type 
of sensible form), which results ultimately from the perception 
of alteration as a subjective process.13 
3) Its Interconnection with Space: 
THESIS: TIME, AS THE IMMEDIATE CONDITION OF INNER 
APPEARANCES, IS ALSO MEDIATELY THE CONDITION FOR 
OUTER (SPATIAL) APPEARANCES AND THUS SUPPLIES THE 
GENERAL FORM OR CONTEXT IN TERMS OF WHICH ALL 
APPEARANCE WHATSOEVER MUST BE PERCEIVED. (Critique 
of Pure Re(J)3on, A 34, B 50) 
Aristotle does not, of course, stress the a priori character of 
time. But in consonance with his more " empirical " point of 
view, he does point out a definite and intimate connection of 
space (the potential serial infinity of continuous magnitude) 11 
and time (the potential measurability, or numerability, of 
spatial motion) . We are speaking here, of course, of time as a 
" material " numberable, and not as the formal enumeration. 
11 Physics, IV, 11, ~ISh. 
12 Ibid., IV, 11, ~19a. 
13 Cf. Mure, Aristotle (London: Benn, 1932), pp. 110, 111, who says, "[the 
perception of alteration] is thus a psychical miniature which enables us to gauge 
an external magnitude or duration, and the implication is that we compare the 
two terms and infer the outer from the inner." (He bases this conclusion on De 
Anima, Ill, ~. 4~6b, and II, 9, 4~1a; on Physics, IV, 11, ~l8b, and on Mem. et 
Remin., ~. 45~b.) 
10 Cf. Ross, Aristotle (London: Methuen, 1949), p. 84. 
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And it is with regard to time in this connotation that Aristotle 
says, 
What is moved is moved from something to something, and all 
magnitude is continuous. Therefore the movement goes with the 
magnitude. Because the magnitude is continuous, the movement 
too must be continuous, and if the movement, then the time.15 
Movement-in-space is thus a kind of "middle term " between 
space and time. The movement takes on the character of the 
continuous extensivity which supplies its material condition. 
And just as the continuous extensivity is divisible ad infinitum, 
so also the movement which is founded upon it is numerable 
ad infinitum. And it is precisely the numerability of motion 
that gives it the material character of time.16 Time is thus, 
in this sense, a new potentiality which is discerned within 
continuous motion, i.e., a latent attribute subject to perception 
and intellectual actualization by a human subject: 
Time ... is continuous since it is an attribute of what is con-
tinuous [that is, motion].17 
As Ross puts it, the multiple, spatially perceptible events in 
the world are capable of taking on the attribute of " time," 
insofar as a single character of " nowness " can be attached to 
the multiplicity of them. And this attribution of "nowness " 
is indeed possible, insofar as each numerically single body is 
passing through a succession of points (geographical points, 
points of qualitative degree, or points of measurable size) 
which is capable of coinciding with the succession of points of 
movement of other bodies.18 
In summary, we can say that, for Kant, space was in-
separably interconnected with time (the formal a priori con-
dition of space); for Aristotle, on the other hand, time is 
inseparably interconnected with space (the material substra-
tum of time) . 
15 Physics, IV, 11, 219a. 
16 Ibid., IV, 11, 219b; 220a. 
17 Ibid., IV, 11, 220a. 
18 Cf. Ross, Aristotle, p. 90. 
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4) Its Infinity: 
THESIS: TIME IS INFINITE AS AN INDEFINITE REPRESEN-
TATION (C. P. R., A 32, B 48) PRIOR TO THE DISCRETE ARITH-
METICAL NUMBERING OF APPEARANCES (Prologomena, para. 9 
and 10)-SUCH THAT IT CAN BE RENDERED PRECISELY 
QUANTITATIVE ONLY THROUGH THE "AXIOMS OF INTUI-
TION" OF THE UNDERSTANDING. (C.P.R., A 162, B 203) IT 
IS ALSO "ETERNAL," AS A COSMOLOGICAL IDEA. (C. P. R., 
A 426, B 454) 
To say that time is "infinite " and that it is " eternal " is 
much the same thing, except that the former term refers 
mainly to time's formal indeterminacy, while the latter term 
refers primarily to the deficiency of precise limits in its cosmic 
content (the series of appearances or events in the world). 
Aristotle, as Kant, comes to the conclusion that time is both 
infinite and eternal. But by a quite different procedure. 
There is no such thing as an actual infinity in any kind of 
magnitude, according to Aristotle/9 But we can discern po-
tential infinities with regard to space, number, and time. Space 
is potentially infinite insofar as it is divisible according to an 
infinite convergent series; number, insofar as it is augmentable 
according to an infinite divergent series. Time, on the other 
hand, is infinite in both ways, i. e., infinitely divisible in that 
it has a continuum of spatial magnitude as its bedrock of 
content 20 and infinitely augmentable in that it is, formally 
speaking, an active numbering produced by the power of 
thought.21 Thus time is a potential infinity both materially, 
i. e., as continuous magnitude potentially divisible by " nows " 
which are always different/2 and formally, i. e., as a product 
of numbering thought, which is an " active " type of potenti-
ality.23 But both the passive potentiality of the continuum 
and the active potentiality of thought are due to the subjective 
19 Physics, II, 6, 206a. 
20 Physics, III, 7, 207b; IV, 12, 220a. 
21 Ibid., III, 8, 208a. For the above general analysis of infinity in space, number, 
and time, cf. Ross, Aristotle, pp. 83-85. 
•• Cf. ibid., IV, 13, 22a; IV, 11, 219a. 
23 De Anima, II, 5, 417b. 
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capacities of man, who does the dividing or the numbering. 
And so we might say that in both aspects of time it is the 
infinite variety of possible subjective variations of objective 
content that gives rise to the " potential infinitude " of time, 
Thus Aristotle and Kant, though widely divergent in their 
approaches, seem to be much at one in discerning the character 
of infinity in the subjective representation of time. 
Likewise with Aristotle" eternity," or an eternal time, results 
when the formal attribute of temporality is attributed to the 
whole series of cosmological events in our experience.24 For 
when we consider this series, it is impossible to form the con-
ception of an absolute beginning with no antecedent or au 
absolute end without succession, and so we are led by reductio 
ad absurdum to posit an eternity of time.25 This is the same 
general line of reasoning which Kant follows in presenting the 
" antithesis " of an eternal world as an insoluble problem m 
the first antinomy of cosmological ideas. 26 
5) Its Role in Statements of Existence: 
THESIS: TIME IS THE REGULATIVE MEANS BY WHICH THE 
UNDERSTANDING GIVES TO APPEARANCES THE FORM OF 
DETERMINATE EXISTENCE THROUGH THE "ANALOGIES OF 
EXPERIENCE" (Prologomena, para, 26; C. P. R., A 32, B 49) AND 
INDEED IS THE CONDITION FOR ALL PREDICATION OF EXIST-
ENCE. (C.P.R., B 71) 
It is Aristotle's doctrine that the sphere of time is co-ter-
minous with the sphere of the physically existent and the 
physically possible, i. e., of things which are capable of some 
kind of physical transience and which are capable of being 
and not-being in succession.27 More precisely, time is the cause 
or condition of that type of existence of which alone we have 
experience-transient existence in this world.28 All of our 
thoughts must refer in some way to such existence-in-time. 
24 Physics, III, 6, 206a; IV, 18, 22b. 
25 Ibid., VIII, I, passim. 
26 Critique of Pure Reason, p. 897 ff. (A 427, B 455). 
27 Physics, IV, 12, 22lb; 222a. 
28 Ibid., IV, 12, 221b; IV, 18, 222b. 
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As Aristotle puts it, 
We cannot exercise the intellect on any object absolutely apart 
from the continuous, or apply it even to non-temporal things unless 
in connection with time.29 
Thus, not only when we make a judgment such as " x exists " 
but also when we make a judgment of the general form "x is 
y "-and even where x and/or y is (are) non-temporal ideas (s) 
or separate substance (s) -the judgment cannot be made with-
out some reference to some experience definitely situated in 
time. And so also, if there be any " truth" in our judgments, 
this cannot obtain without some relationship to the continuum 
of time.30 
6) Time's Unification in and Through Consciousness: 
THESIS: OUR INTUITION OF TIME, BY MEANS OF THE 
SCHEMATA OF THE IMAGINATION, (0. P. R., A 138, B 177) IS 
SUBORDINATED NATURALLY TO OUR UNITY OF APPRECEP-
TION, WHICH IS THE PRIOR CONDITION FOR KNOWLEDGE OF 
THE EMPIRICAL IN GENERAL, (0. P. R., A 343, B 68, 401, 422) 
AND (IN THIS SUBORDINATE ROLE) GOVERNS THE APPLICA-
TION OF THE CATEGORIES OF THE UNDERSTANDING TO THE 
WORLD OF APPEARANCE. (0. P.R., A 138, B 177) 
In Metaph., IV, 6,31 Aristotle criticizes Heraclitus and other 
epistemological relativists who say that all true being and 
beings are merely their own contingent and relative perceptions 
of things. In doing this, argues Aristotle, they imply that they 
themselves have no unity of being, but are, rather, discrete 
multiplicities. For if all objects of knowledge differ only re-
lationally, i.e., insofar as they have a different relationship to 
the knower, then the knower himself must be a different corre-
spondent term for every object which is related to him (just 
as an object which is double, and triple, and equal can only be 
so insofar as it is related to a different term under each of 
these aspects) . 
29 De M em. et Remin., 450a. 
3° Cf. Metaph., IX, 9, 105lb; also, De Anima, III, 6, 480a. 
31 Cf. loc. cit., lOll b. 
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Thus although Aristotle does not point explicitly to any 
" unity of apperception" as a positive attribute of intellective 
consciousness, he does take such unity for granted in arguing 
against those who by their own doctrines are forced to conceive 
consciousness as a series of discrete, non-related states or 
motions. And since time is perceived in a primary way through 
the motions of one's own consciousness, it would be implied 
that it is subsumed in a immediate manner into the higher 
unity of intellective consciousness, for the purpose of rendering 
judgments of physical reality possible. 
7) Its All-Inclusive Unity: 
THESIS: ALTHOUGH WE CAN THINK DISTINCT TIMES IN 
SUCCESSION, ALL THESE TIMES ARE MERELY DETERMINA-
TIONS OF ONE ALL-PERVASIVE, ALL-INCLUSIVE, GENERAL 
TIME, WHICH IS NOT A DETERMINATE ABSTRACT CONCEPT 
BUT AN INDETERMINATE FORMAL CONDITION OF REFER-
ENCE TO THE PHENOMENAL WORLD. (C.P.R., A 32, B 47) 
As we might expect, Aristotle attributes such all-inclusive 
unity to time as a quasi-material substratum rather than as a 
formal condition: 
According to him, time as numerable-i. e., as the continuum 
of motion which is measurable 32-is par excellence the cyclical 
motion of the heavenly spheres, which proceed most regularly, 
uniformly, predictably.33 But since there is a greater time 
which measures all time and all existents,34 we might reason-
ably say that the motion of the outermost sphere would be the 
single numerable continuum giving rise to all numerability and 
time in subordinate spheres. And, indeed, this one recurring 
outer motion would be the primordial continuum giving rise 
to the possibility of all actual time as the numbering of 
motion.35 As Randall says, the eternal circular motion of the 
outer sphere of the universe is 
•• Physics, IV, 12, 221a. 
•• Ibid., IV, 14, 223b. 
"'Ibid., IV, 12, 221b. 
35 Physics, IV, 13, 222a. 
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the common frame of reference for all temporal measurement, 
since its number is best known, i. e., as primarily conditioning all 
regularity whatsoever.36 
Thus, just as Kant from his idealistic vantage point sees time 
as a unique form of sensibility containing in an indeterminate 
way all particular, determinate times, so also Aristotle, with a 
more objective orientation, sees it primarily as an attribute or 
inherent possibility of the unique " outermost sphere" of the 
universe. 
8) Its Inapplicability to any " Transcendent" World: 
THESIS: "ETERNITY" AS A PURELY TRANSCENDENTAL 
IDEA IS WITHOUT REAL INTUITIVELY-GIVEN CONTENT OR 
REFERENCE TO THE REALLY KNOWABLE WORLD OF TEM-
PORAL PHENOMENA. (C. P. R., A 641, B 669) 
It should be noted that we are speaking here not of " eternal 
time " as a cosmological idea but of eternity as an anthropomo-
phically-conceived attribute of some metaphysical " necessary 
being " or some metaphysical world. As such, it is a merely 
negative concept and denotes the timelessness of a necessary 
being, or of an ens realissimum, or of a separate substance, or 
of an idea, or of a " moment " as created arbitrarily by a 
numbering mind, or of an eternal principle whose denial results 
in self-contradiction. 
Aristotle states quite clearly that time neither measures nor 
affects any such sphere of eternity or anything whose nature 
is eternal in this strict, absolute sense of the word.37 Time is 
validly applicable only to the sphere of physical, corporeal 
transience. It ceases to apply just short of the boundaries of 
thought and the entities of thought.38 
Aristotle differs from Kant, of course, in that he posits a 
metaphysical world of the prime mover and the unmoved 
36 Randall, Aristotle, p. ~03. 
37 Physics, IV, 1~, ~2la; ~~lb. 
38 It should be noted, however, that, while time does not apply to these 
boundaries, it is still the material means and context out of which such "bound-
aries" are formulated. (Cf. sect. 5, snpra) 
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movers and the souls of the primary celestial self-movers in 
each sphere 39 and the separable " active " intelligence in 
man; 40 and in that he speaks of such " eternal " things as of 
real entities. Kant, on the other hand, only admits the possi-
bility of some such things, and the practical fact that we must 
sometimes presuppose them, in order to give greater unity and 
completeness to our knowledge. But whether such a "meta-
physical " world be conceived as an actuality or as a bare, 
empty possibility, it is granted by both philosophers that time 
will be completely inapplicable to it. Neither of them will 
admit of a monistic structure in which time and eternity can 
somehow be identical. 
CoNcLuSION 
Just as two persons who begin at different sides of a room 
would be apt to apply the terms, " right," "left," " front," and 
" behind " in different ways to the same things, it would seem 
that the different starting points of Kant and Aristotle-as 
mentioned in the introduction-have led them to describe 
certain selfsame attributes of time in different ways. Thus, 
for instance, Kant sees time as a formal unity, while Aristotle 
sees it as a unity in its material substratum of continuous 
extension; both see it as interconnected with space, but Ari-
stotle, unlike Kant, takes space as the starting point for this 
insight; both see it as an infinity, but Aristotle designates it a 
potential infinity of that which is actual and determinate, while 
Kant designates it an actual infinity of that which is of its very 
nature incomplete and contentless (the a priori form of 
sensibility) ; and so forth. 
One of the most notable things that can be discerned in the 
unity-in-difference which prevails between Kant and Aristotle 
on the subject of time is that the former is almost always 
speaking about it in its formal aspect, while the latter is 
•• Provided that such souls are taken as distinct in existence from the " unmoved 
mover" of each sphere. It is not clear whether Aristotle can be interpreted in 
this way. 
•• De Anima, ill, 5, 4SOA. 
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very often merely referring to it in its material or potential 
aspect. Once this is understood, we have the key to a good 
number of moot points which seem at first encounter to repre-
sent widely divergent opinions or solutions but then upon 
further examination are found to be most conveniently re-
ducible to poles of attitudinal bias. 
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